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We conduct a multi-period ultimatum game in which we elicit players’ beliefs. Responders
do not predict accurately the amount that will be offered to them, and do not get better
in their predictions over time. At the individual level we see some effect of the mistake
in expectations in the previous period on the responder’s expectation about the offer in
the current period, but this effect is relatively small. The proposers’ beliefs about the
minimum amount that responders will accept is significantly higher than the minimum
amount responders believe will be accepted by other responders. The proposer’s belief
about the minimal acceptable offer does not change following a rejection. Nevertheless,
the proposer’s offer in the next period does increase following a rejection. The probability
of rejection increases when the responder has higher expectations about the amount that
will be offered to him or higher beliefs about the minimal amount that other responders
will accept.
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INTRODUCTION
In experiments on social preferences involving real monetary out-
comes, the results frequently reveal that people are motivated not
only by their own outcomes but also by those of others, percep-
tions of social norms, and beliefs. In interdependent situations
such as simple bargaining environments people are even willing
to reduce their payoff in order to punish those whomistreat them.
Insights about the motivations and characteristics of non-selfish
behavior obtained from experiments may help to understand a
variety of economic behaviors. Notably, subjects’ desire to reduce
differences between theirs and others’ payoffs affects their deci-
sions. They also want to increase or decrease others’ payoffs
depending on how fairly those others are behaving. Furthermore,
people’s perceptions regarding themselves and their beliefs about
others might affect their social behavior.
In the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982), a first player (pro-
poser) offers a split of the bargaining pie to a second player
(responder), who can either accept the offered split or reject it.
A rejection results in a payoff of zero to both players. Therefore
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) involves a respon-
der who accepts any positive offer and consequently the proposer
will offer the minimal positive amount1 . However, actual play
in experiments is inconsistent with this prediction: responders
who feel they have been treated unfairly (receiving low offers)
often harm the proposer’s payoff even at a cost to themselves by
1If we assume that the responder accepts an offer when he is indifferent
between doing so and rejecting it, the equilibrium involves a proposer who
offers zero and a responder who accepts the offer.
rejecting positive offers2. Moreover, proposers usually anticipate
this and therefore offer much above theminimal positive amount.
The responders’ rejection of low offers suggests that social moti-
vations such as fairness are important. It is harder to know
whether the proposers’ behavior of offering significant amounts
is only strategic (to avoid rejection) or also reflects social consid-
erations. Comparison of ultimatum games to other games such as
the dictator game, in which the first player determines a division
of the pie and the second player cannot reject it, suggests that both
strategic and social motivations affect the proposer’s behavior in
the ultimatum game3. Brañas-Garza et al. (2014), for example, use
the combination of behavior in the dictator game and the ultima-
tum game to classify subjects into two different sub-populations,
of prosocial punishers and spiteful (antisocial) punishers.
Previous findings in ultimatum games show that when an
unequal share of roughly a quarter of the pie is proposed, the
responders’ sense of fairness is often violated, and consequently,
approximately one half of the offers are rejected. As Güth et al.
(1982) show, relative to the theoretical predictions, proposers
offer far too much and responders reject far too frequently.
However, there is some variance in the rejection portion based on
2A notable exception in which many responders agreed to a zero offer (using
the strategymethod) is reported by Brañas-Garza et al. (2006), who conducted
the ultimatum game in a gypsy community in Vallecas, Madrid.
3See chapter 2 of Camerer (2003) for a survey on dictator and ultimatum
games and for an explanation regarding the contribution of the ultimatum
game to studying social preferences. Another illustration of the importance of
the ultimatum game and its large impact on understanding social behavior is
provided by van Damme et al. (2014).
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multiple moderating variables such as gender, repetition, players’
level of anonymity, etc. (Camerer, 2003). Several studies on ulti-
matum games with high stakes find that while responders may
reject less often when the stakes are high, they still reject some
positive offers (Hoffman et al., 1996a; Slonim and Roth, 1998;
Cameron, 1999).
Güth (1988) and Straub and Murnighan (1995) suggest that
players want to be treated fairly. Responders expect to receive
equal offers, and therefore reject small offers in order to pun-
ish proposers who behave unfairly. Proposers are also influenced
by notions of fairness, and consequently make equal offers. In
contrast, Weg and Zwick (1994) argue that proposers realize the
risk of rejection of small offers, and therefore maximize their
expected profits by offering approximately half of the pie. Other
studies show that behavior can be affected by the context and
the beliefs of the players. For example, when the assignment of
players to become the proposers is made because they obtained
a higher score on a knowledge test, they offer less fair offers
(Hoffman et al., 1994). Responders who are unaware of the size of
the divided amount accept smaller amounts, and proposers who
know about the unawareness of the responders offer less (Pillutla
and Murnighan, 1995; Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Croson,
1996; Kagel et al., 1996). Other experiments show that when pro-
posers feel more anonymous, they propose less (Hoffman et al.,
1996b; Novak et al., 2000). Finally, if proposers know that their
decision can be observed by others, they become more generous
(Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Straub and Murnighan, 1995).
Belief elicitation is the task of capturing individuals’ thoughts
about future outcomes. Understanding individuals’ beliefs may
help to predict their behavior and decisions. Haruvy et al. (2007)
elicit traders’ predictions of future price trajectories in repeated
experimental asset markets and show that traders’ expectations
are influenced by previous prices. Isen et al. (2010) present the
possibility of predicting behavior in economic games by asking
the players about their beliefs and intentions. They ask players
directly about their sense of fairness, defined as what they think
they ought to do. Gächter and Renner (2010) elicit beliefs in pub-
lic goods experiments and show that when beliefs are elicited, they
affect decisions. Armantier and Treich (2013) combine theory and
experimental evidence to address the issue of proper scoring rules
used to incentivize belief elicitation. Their results show complex
distortions of reported beliefs, questioning the ability of proper
scoring rules to identify truthful beliefs. Interestingly, Haruvy
et al. (2007) report no effect of belief elicitation on outcomes.
Behavior is often affected by beliefs about the opponents’
actions, and can be a response to intentions and not only to out-
comes. Rabin (1993), for example, assumes that when choosing a
strategy, each player’s subjective expected utility depends not only
on their strategy, but also on higher order beliefs (their beliefs
about other players’ strategy choice, and their beliefs about the
beliefs of others about their own strategy). Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) present, in light of a wide range of experimental games, a
formal theory of reciprocity, where people evaluate the kindness
of an action not only by its consequences but also by its under-
lying intention. Loewenstein (2000) argues that visceral factors
(such as emotions, feelings and drive states) have important—
though often underappreciated—consequences for beliefs and
behavior. Charness and Rabin (2002) design a range of simple
experimental games, showing that subjects behave according to
their beliefs. Falk et al. (2008) provide experimental evidence for
the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions.
Offerman et al. (1996) present an experimental analysis of
contributions and measure of individuals’ expectations about
the behavior of others in their group. Dufwenberg and Gneezy
(2000) measure beliefs experimentally and find positive correla-
tion between a given sum of money and the giver’s expectations
about the responder’s expectations concerning this sum. Brañas-
Garza and Espinosa (2011) find that subjects do not predict
end-game effects in a linear public good game, and there is very
little updating of beliefs. Danz et al. (2012) study beliefs and
actions in a repeated normal-form game and find consistency
between beliefs and actions. Ziegelmeyer et al. (2010) find that
participants’ elicited beliefs are consistent with their own behav-
ior. Interestingly, Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008) find in
one-shot games that subjects act inconsistently with their stated
beliefs in almost half of the games.
Beliefs are also elicited in dictator games. Rigdon and Levine
(2011) elicit beliefs in a modified dictator game to better
understand gender differences in decisions. They show that the
behavioral differences between males and females is a result of
differences in beliefs, rather than in the cost of giving. Iriberri
and Rey-Biel (2013) elicited deciders’ beliefs about the preferences
of other deciders, finding correlations between subjects’ beliefs
and their social type. Brañas-Garza and Rodriguez-Lara (2014)
also elicit participants’ beliefs of their peers. They find that while
dictators believe they are more generous to their recipients than
other dictators, recipients believe that their dictators are less gen-
erous than others. While it is interesting to see how beliefs are
formed in the dictator game, it cannot provide insights on the
connection between experience, beliefs and behavior. A dictator
may have beliefs about her actions, but there is no feedback to
learn from, because there is no behavioral reply on the side of the
recipient.
We use the ultimatum game, where the proposer may expe-
rience a rejection to her offer, and where responders may feel
disappointed. This type of feedback may affect both belief for-
mation and decisions in the future. The ultimatum game can
therefore enrich our understanding of social preferences. Camerer
(2003) describes the ultimatum game as a “. . . crisp way to
measure social preferences rather than a deep test of strate-
gic thinking.” Responders may find an offer either insulting or
fair. Proposers, on the other hand, may find rejections unfair or
understandable.
The importance of the ultimatum game as a tool for studying
social behavior and the significance of beliefs in affecting behav-
ior lead to the question what may we learn by eliciting beliefs
in the ultimatum game. In this article we study the formation
of beliefs and their connection with social behavior in the
ultimatum game. We explore whether actions taken by subjects
are sometimes inconsistent with their stated beliefs. We also
study whether beliefs of players in one role are consistent with
beliefs and actions of players in another role. Finally, we also test
how past experience affects the formation of current beliefs and
how they, in turn, affect future decisions. Because the experiment
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involves five periods, we can also analyze how beliefs and actions
develop over time.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Seven experimental sessions were conducted in the computer
lab of the Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business & Management
at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, with a total of 68 par-
ticipants (29 female and 39 male)4 . Each session was formed
with an even number of participants (between 8 and 12). All
participants were undergraduate students recruited by posting
announcements on an electronic university-wide message board,
in a variety of faculties and disciplines. The computers were pro-
grammed using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and no
individual participated in more than one session.
The sessions were structured as follows: subjects were ran-
domly assigned either the role of a proposer or the role of a
responder. Then, subjects read the instructions, followed by one
trial period and a short multiple-choice questions quiz to make
sure they understood the instructions. Then, each subject played
an ultimatum game five times (referred to as “periods”), and
remained in all periods in the same role. In each period, one
proposer was randomly matched with one responder, to avoid
learning of a specific opponent’s behavior or reputation building.
The participants could not know who their opponents were5.
The proposers were first asked in each period to make an offer
to responders on how to divide between the two of them a pie
of 50 Shekels (about 14 USD). After making the offer, each pro-
poser submitted her belief regarding the minimum amount the
responder will be willing to accept. Responders were asked at
the beginning of each period to submit their beliefs regarding
the amount they expect to receive from the proposer, and the
minimal amount they think that other responders will be will-
ing to accept. Proposers did not know that responders’ beliefs are
elicited and vice versa. Later they were presented with the offer
made by the proposer and were asked to decide whether to accept
or reject it. This experimental design allowed us to explore vari-
ous issues related to behavior, beliefs, and how these develop with
experience.
In each period, responders observed the amounts offered by
their proposers, and proposers could see if their offer was rejected
or accepted. At the end of each period, they could observe their
payoff. No additional feedback was given to the participants. At
the end of the session, the computer randomly chose one period
and the results from this period were used for compensation.
This type of payoff eliminates wealth effects, which are not being
studied in this paper. We did not pay the participants for their
beliefs. While understanding the importance of such element, we
could not implement payment incentives to most of the beliefs
we elicit. Paying for belief elicitation should be based on a scor-
ing rule, which scores the assessor (in our case, participants)
4The experiment conforms to the relevant regulatory standards, was approved
by the Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business & Management at Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev ethics committee, and informed consent was obtained
from all subjects.
5Although in some sessions it was possible that participants were paired with
the same person twice, they did not know if and when that happened and who
that person was.
based on how close they were to some actual outcome6. Two of
the three types of elicited beliefs were not based on such cases.
Proposers’ beliefs about the minimal amount that responders will
accept cannot be compared to a real outcome, because we do not
know this minimal amount, but rather only whether a specific
offer was accepted or rejected. The same issue applies to respon-
ders’ beliefs about the minimal amount that other responders
will accept. Regarding responders’ beliefs about the amount they
expect proposers to give, any payment may increase responders’
tendency to reject offers that are lower than expected, because
responders may consider payment from belief elicitation as some
sort of compensation7.
Let us turn to explain our main hypotheses. While much of the
literature finds actions to be consistent with beliefs, some exam-
ples for inconsistency exist (e.g., Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker,
2008). We hypothesize that proposers can easily realize that it is
not beneficial to offer amounts that they believe will be rejected,
and consequently that proposers will offer at least the minimal
amount that they believe is required for acceptance of their offer:
H1: Proposers will not offer to responders amounts below the
minimum they think that responders will accept.
Subjects in the experiment were assigned randomly to the roles
of proposers and responders. It therefore seems natural to expect
that responders will be able to imagine themselves in the role of
proposers, and consequently to make correct predictions about
the offers that proposers will make. However, it is also possible
that responders will manage their expectations strategically, and
in particular they may be pessimistic and expect a relatively small
offer, in order to experience later a positive surprising gift when
the actual offer is received (see Khalmetski et al., 2013).
H2: Responders’ expectations about the amounts that will be
offered to themwill be on average either equal to or lower than actual
offers.
Proposers are asked to evaluate the minimal offer that will
be accepted, and similarly responders are asked about the min-
imal offer that other responders will accept. Similar to the
previous hypothesis, because proposers and responders come
from the same subject pool and role assignment is random, it
seems natural to expect that their beliefs will be similar. Brañas-
Garza and Rodriguez-Lara (2014), for example, find no differ-
ences in expectations between dictators and recipients in dictator
games, suggesting that the role in the experiment might not
affect the formation of beliefs. To test this, we hypothesize as
follows:
H3: Proposers’ beliefs about the minimal acceptable offer will be
on average equal to responders’ beliefs about the minimal acceptable
offer of other responders.
Proposers whose offers are rejected may infer that they under-
estimated the minimal acceptable amount and therefore have to
6The literature on this issue is wide and extensive. Two classic examples are
Friedman (1983) and Selten (1998).
7Gächter and Renner (2010) report higher contribution levels in a public
goods experiment when beliefs are incentivized. It is possible that participants
considered the monetary incentive as some kind of compensation that allows
them to contribute higher amounts. We believe that the circumstances in our
experiment may be similar.
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raise their offers so that they get accepted8. This leads to the next
double hypothesis:
H4a: After a rejected offer, the proposer’s belief about the minimal
acceptable offer will increase.
H4b: After a rejected offer, the proposer’s offer will increase.
The ultimatum game is not something people face much in
the real world and therefore the responders’ expectations about
the offers they will receive are likely to be updated during the
experiment according to the offers received (despite changing the
opponent in each period). This leads to our next hypothesis:
H5: The change between periods in the responder’s expecta-
tion about the offer is an increasing function of the difference in
the previous period between the actual offer and the responder’s
expectation.
Rejection of any positive amount is not beneficial from an eco-
nomic perspective, because it results in a zero rather than positive
payoff. It follows that rejections are motivated by psychological
and social motivations. In particular, we hypothesize that feelings
of being treated unfairly and being disappointed by the offer may
lead to rejections. Such feelings are likely to be stronger when the
offer is lower, and when the responder’s expectations about the
amount he will receive are higher. This leads to our next double
hypothesis:
H6a: The probability of rejection will be a decreasing function of
the offer amount.
H6b: The probability of rejection will be an increasing function
of the responder’s expectation about the offer amount.
When a responder is asked about the minimal amount that he
believes that others will accept, he may think that others behave
8However, recall that the proposer is re-matched with another receiver in each
period. If a proposer believes that there is a distribution of receiver prefer-
ences, he may conclude after a rejected offer not that he was wrong in his
belief about the mean of that distribution, but rather that he was just unlucky
and sampled an extreme observation from this distribution (a receiver with a
relatively high minimal acceptable offer). Then the proposer may infer that he
need not update his beliefs about the minimal acceptable offer and need not
change his offer in the next period. If the vast majority of proposers behave in
this manner, then we should not find support for H4a and H4b in the data.
the sameway he will, or hemay perceive some differences between
himself and others. But even if the intentions attributed to oth-
ers are unequal to the responder’s own intentions (regarding the
minimal acceptable amount), we believe that the two are posi-
tively correlated. It follows that when a responder attributes a
higher minimal acceptable amount to others he also has a higher
acceptance threshold himself, leading to our last hypothesis:
H7: The probability of rejection will be an increasing function of
the responder’s belief about the minimum that other responders will
accept.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DISTRIBUTION OF BELIEFS AND OFFERS
With a total of 34 proposers and 34 responders in five peri-
ods, the data includes 170 offers and 170 accept/reject decisions.
Accordingly, we obtained 170 samples for each belief variable that
was elicited. The distribution of some main variables of interest
over all periods is presented in Table 1.
We can see in Table 1 that the amount offered is usually (120
out of 170 offers) between 31 and 50% of the pie (57 are of equal
split, i.e., exactly 50%). Offers of more than 50% of the total pie
(i.e., more than 25 Shekels) are uncommon (10 out of 170 offers).
Of the 170 offers, 103 offers give the receiver less than 50%; 23
give only 20% or less. The distribution of responders’ expecta-
tions about how much they will be offered is somewhat similar,
but more condensed, and with a little higher mean. In 150 out of
170 cases they expect offers of 31–50%. They predict high offers
(51% and above) less frequently than they occur (5 vs. 12 cases),
but also under-predict low offers of up to 20% (2 such predictions
compared to 23 such offers).
The minimum proposers expect responders to accept is infre-
quently higher than 50%, with the most prevalent range being
31–40%, and then the equal split or a little less (41–50%). A
substantial number of observations are in the lower ranges up
to 30%, and even in the range 0–10% we have 13 observations.
Interestingly, when asked about what other responders will do,
the responders become even more extreme than the proposers in
anticipating low values of acceptable offers. 58 responders think
Table 1 | Distribution of beliefs and offers.
0–10% 11–20% 21–30% 31–40% 41–50% 51–60% 61–70% 71–80% 81–90% % Round
Amount proposers offer to
responders
9 14 17 45 75 8 1 1 0 82
Amount responders believe they
will be offered
1 1 13 66 84 4 0 1 0 94
Minimum amount proposers
believe responders will accept
13 11 22 68 44 5 6 1 0 85
Minimum amount responders
believe other responders will agree
to accept
25 33 31 57 22 0 1 1 0 87
Responders’ earnings 31 8 10 36 75 8 1 1 0 86
Proposers’ earnings 30 1 1 5 60 52 12 8 1 89
The table presents the number of observations in each range. The total of each row (without the “% round” column) is 170. The right column designates what
percentage of the entire range of values for the variable in this row have a round percentage of the pie (ending with 0, i.e., 10, 20, 30, . . . , 90%); this is equivalent
to Shekel amounts ending with 5 or 0.
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that other responders will agree to offers of 0–20% (compared
to 24 proposers in that range). Earnings are most often equal or
with a low inequality in favor of the proposer. Some responders
get low offers and nevertheless accept, resulting in 18 observa-
tions with responders’ earnings between 11 and 30%. The 30
observations with proposers’ earnings between 0 and 10% are
all the result of rejected offers. There are 31 responders with
earnings between 0 and 10% because in addition to the 30 rejec-
tions there was one responder who received an offer of 10% and
accepted it.
Some more information is provided by looking at some rel-
evant correlations. The correlation between the minimum pro-
posers believe that responders will accept and the offers they give
them is 0.386. The correlation between the minimum respon-
ders believe that other responders will accept and the amount
responders think they will be offered is 0.384.
CHOICES OF ROUND NUMBERS
As reported in the right column of Table 1, the data have a large
percentage of round choices, defined as amounts that end with 5
or 0 (since the pie to be divided is 50 Shekels, these amounts are
0, 10, 20%, . . . of the total pie). If choices followed a uniform dis-
tribution, then the percentage of round choices should have been
around 22%9 . Because the equal split (25) is a round number and
is a frequent choice, it raises the percentage of round numbers,
but it is only partially responsible for the right column including
numbers of 82% and above, rather than numbers slightly above
20%. We think that this strong preference for round numbers has
some interesting potential reasons and implications. One possi-
ble reason is that choosing non-round numbers may be perceived
as small-minded, and people want to avoid feeling small-minded,
or avoid being perceived as small-minded by others who observe
their behavior. Another possible reason is that people find it eas-
ier to think about round numbers, and therefore choosing round
9There are eleven round numbers (0, 5, 10, . . . , 50) out of 51 possible ones (0,
1, 2, . . . , 50).
numbers reduces their cognitive burden in these decisions and
therefore is preferred. This behavior has implications for experi-
mental design. For example, if adding a full range of choices for
the subject rather than just a few round choices is very compli-
cated, it may be reasonable to go with the simpler design because
most subjects are likely to choose the round-number options
anyway.
EXPERIMENTAL DECISIONS, BELIEFS AND OUTCOMES BY PERIOD
Table 2 presents the means of various variables in the different
periods. In line with previous research, the amount proposers
offer to responders (M = 40.47%, SD = 13.13) is significantly
lower than the amount proposers leave for themselves (M =
59.53%, SD = 13.13), a statistically significant difference using
a t-test (t = 9.45, p < 0.001). Overall, 140 of the 170 offers
were accepted. All offers above 40% are accepted, most offers
of 40% are accepted (34 out of 38), and often lower offers are
also accepted (e.g., 10 offers of 30% and 8 offers of 20%). It is
therefore not surprising that on average, the responders’ earnings
(M = 36.27%, SD = 19.14) are lower than the proposers’ earn-
ings (M = 46.08%, SD = 23.26), a significant difference (t =
9.447, p < 0.001).
Looking at the changes between periods, we can see that the
three belief variables (minimum % of the pie proposers believe
responders will accept; % of the pie responders believe they will
be offered; and minimum % of the pie responders believe other
responders will accept) do not fluctuate much and do not show a
consistent time trend. The amount proposers offer to responders
decreases from 45.70% in period 1–40% in period 2 (t = 2.32,
p = 0.022), stays essentially constant until period 4 (between
periods 2–3: t = −0.02, p = 0.980; between periods 3–4: t =
0.03, p = 0.976), and then drops again from 40% in period 4–
36.58% in period 5 (t = 1.80, p = 0.075). The mirror picture of
this is seen in the amount proposers leave for themselves, since the
two amounts always sum to 100%. We can also see that the differ-
ence between offers and the proposers’ beliefs about the minimal
acceptable offer goes down from 6.82% in period 1 to −0.30%
in period 2 (t = 1.62, p = 0.110) and later is relatively stable (the
Table 2 | Experimental decisions, beliefs and outcomes by period.
Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean % Overall Overall
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Mean % SD
% Of the pie proposers offer to
responders = A
45.70 40.00 40.06 40.00 36.58 40.47 13.13
Minimum % of the pie proposers
believe responders will accept = B
38.88 40.30 38.24 38.94 37.36 38.74 14.37
Proposers’ offer above belief = A – B 6.82 −0.30 1.82 1.06 −0.78 1.73
% Of the pie responders believe they
will be offered = C
43.42 45.30 43.76 44.12 44.94 44.31 7.78
Responders’ belief above offer = C – A −2.28 5.30 3.70 4.12 8.36 3.84
Minimum % of the pie responders
believe other responders will agree to
accept
30.18 31.18 31.42 30.12 30.52 30.68 14.65
Responders’ earnings (% of the pie) 42.24 36.00 36.58 35.94 30.58 36.27 19.15
Proposers’ earnings (% of the pie) 43.06 46.36 48.70 49.36 42.94 46.08 23.26
Number of rejected offers 5 6 5 5 9
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p-values of the t-test for difference in means between periods 2–3,
3–4, and 4–5 are also above 0.57).
The decrease in offers after period 1 could reflect the result
that most offers were accepted (29 of 34), leading proposers to
update their beliefs about the minimal acceptable amount down-
wards and consequently to offer less in the next period. However,
here the experimental design, which elicited not only offers but
also beliefs, becomes useful. Looking at the proposers’ beliefs
about the minimal acceptable amount, we do not see any down-
ward change (the average increases from 38.88 to 40.3% between
period 1 and 2). Moreover, if a small number of rejections should
result in the proposers trying to offer less, it is not clear why there
is no such trend after periods 2 and 3, in which the number of
rejections is similar to that in period 1.
When we take periods 2–4 and compare them to period 1, the
lower offers and stable rejections result in increased earnings for
the proposers and reduced earnings for the responders. Between
periods 4 and 5 proposers again lower their offers (from 40 to
36.58%). In period 5, as opposed to the reduction in offers after
period 1, this results in an increase in the number of rejections
to 9. The responders are then hurt by both the low offers and the
increased rejections and earn much less than in any other period
(about 15% less than in periods 2–4 and about 28% less than in
period 1). The proposers earn in period 5 less than in periods 2–
4, but similar to period 1 (because the reduced offers are offset by
the increased rejections).
PROPOSERS’ OFFERS vs. EXPECTATIONS
We continue to test the hypotheses presented in the previous sec-
tion, starting with proposers’ consistency between expectations
and actions and using individual-level data. One possible rea-
son for offers that exceed the proposer’s belief about the minimal
acceptable offer (we have 75 such offers out of 170) is fairness
considerations of the proposer. For example, the proposer may
think that an offer of 30% will be accepted, but nevertheless offer
50% because she wants to be fair. This is in line with results in
the dictator game, where in most cases the dictators give positive
amounts to the other player despite him not being able to reject
the split. A second possible reason for offers above the expected
minimal acceptable amount is heterogeneity of responders. For
example, the proposer may believe that the average responder
requires 30%, but she may also think that some responders will
accept only offers above 40%, and decide that there are sufficiently
many of these to justify offering 40% to increase the likelihood
that the offer will be accepted. Such behavior of increasing offers
to reduce the risk of rejection, at a cost of reducing the proposer’s
payoff if the offer is accepted, is likely to be more prominent the
more risk averse is the proposer. This is because a higher offer
means a lower possible payoff (in case of acceptance) but with
more certainty.
In 59 offers, the amount offered was exactly equal to the pro-
poser’s belief about the minimum the responder would accept, a
reasonable behavior if the proposer wants to give the minimum
that is required to get her offer accepted. However, it is harder to
justify the 36 offers in the data that are below the proposer’s belief
about the minimal acceptable offer. If a proposer believes that an
offer below 30% will be rejected, then offering lower amounts is
likely to be rejected and yield her a zero payoff. Why would she
then offer such a low amount? We therefore refer to such deci-
sions as “inconsistent,” whereas “consistent” decisions are those
where offers are not lower than the proposers’ beliefs about the
minimal acceptable offer. The number of inconsistent decisions is
equal to 7, 8, 5, 8, and 8 in periods 1–5, respectively; it varies only
a little between periods and does not show any clear time trend.
One possible reason for offers below the expected minimal
acceptable amount is that some proposers may feel that the
responders’ minimal acceptable amount is too high and unjus-
tified. These proposers may then prefer to take the risk of rejec-
tion than to offer more than they think the responder deserves.
Another possible reason for inconsistent decisions is that the pro-
poser believes that there is enough variation in the responders’
threshold for acceptance that it is worth trying to keep a larger
share of the pie despite the increased chance of rejection10. This
suggests once again that the behavior of proposers may be related
to their risk attitudes. However, the inconsistent decisions may
also represent mistakes or inconsistency of the proposer between
her response to the belief question and the decision about the
offer to make.
Next, we test consistent and inconsistent decisions separately.
The average “proposers’ offer above belief” computed only for
the 134 cases in which it is zero or positive (i.e., consistent deci-
sions) is 6.94%. It starts at 12.38 in period 1 and drops to the
range 5.24–6.00% in the next four periods. The initial decline is
mostly due to the decrease in amounts offered after period 1. For
the 134 consistent decisions, a regression where the offer is the
dependent variable and the belief about the minimal acceptable
offer is the independent variable gives a coefficient of 0.69 (p =
0.000). For the 36 inconsistent decisions (negative “proposers’
offer above belief”) there is no time trend, and the average value
is−14.58,−20.76,−18.40,−14.24, and−20.26% in periods 1–5,
respectively.
Are people “consistently” inconsistent? To answer this ques-
tion we count the number of inconsistent offers for each subject
(recall that each proposer makes five offers during the experi-
ment). Figure 1 presents the results. Of the 34 proposers, 15 are
inconsistent at least once, and 10 make more than one incon-
sistent decision. Only one proposer is inconsistent in all rounds.
Thus, a substantial number of proposers (although not a majority
of them) violate our hypothesis H1.
ACCURACY OF EXPECTATIONS
We now move on to test hypothesis H2. As presented in Table 2,
the amount responders expect to receive is 44.30% on average,
whereas the average offer is 40.48%. The difference is statisti-
cally significant (t = 3.30, p = 0.001). Considering the difference
between expectations and offers in each period separately (see
“Responders’ belief above offer” in Table 2) shows an interesting
switch from a negative difference in period 1 to positive in the
other periods. The amount responders expect to receive fluctu-
ates relatively little, so the main changes in this difference, after
10A higher variation in responders’ acceptance threshold around its average
results in a smaller increase in the probability of rejection due to a given
reduction in the offer (to below the average threshold).
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periods 1 and 4, are due to the decrease in the offers. When con-
sidering the periods separately, in some periods the difference
is not statistically significant (recall that each period has only
34 observations of the offer and the responder’s expectations).
In periods 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 the p-value of the t-test for differ-
ence in means between the offer and the responders’ expectations
is 0.389, 0.094, 0.182, 0.038, and 0.001, respectively. Thus, with
the exception of period 3, each period has a lower p-value than
the preceding period. This is surprising. A reasonable conjecture
would yield the opposite pattern: as responders accumulate expe-
rience in the game they should become better in predicting the
offer, and the difference between offers and expectations should
then become less significant over time. The data, however, show
that responders’ expectations at the aggregate level do not seem to
be updated much based on the new information in each period.
In periods 2, 3, and 4 responders get an average offer of about
40%, and yet their average expectation hardly changes, remains
FIGURE 1 | Number of inconsistent decisions by the same proposer.
on average a little above 44%, and even goes a bit up after peri-
ods 3 and 4. This pattern may be interpreted as overconfidence
of responders in their beliefs, a phenomenon that was illustrated
in other contexts (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; Malmendier and
Tate, 2005). Overall, we see that the data do not support H2 and
the responders’ expectations regarding the offers are not accurate
on one hand, and not pessimistic and lower than actual offers on
the other hand, but rather they tend to be optimistic.
Moving to hypothesis H3, we see in Table 2 that the min-
imum amount proposers believe that responders will accept
(M = 38.74%, SD = 14.36) is higher than the minimum amount
responders believe will be accepted by other responders (M =
30.68%, SD = 14.66), a significant difference (t = 5.12, p <
0.001). This implies that our hypothesis H3 is not supported by
the data. What creates this significant difference in expectations
between proposers and responders? This is an interesting question
but to answer it further research will be required.
THE EFFECT OF REJECTIONS ON BELIEFS AND OFFERS
To test Hypothesis 4, we define “Rejected t-1,” a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the offer in the previous period was rejected and
0 otherwise. This variable is only defined for proposers in peri-
ods 2–5. We also define “Proposer belief” as the proposer’s belief
about the minimal acceptable offer; “Offer” is the amount offered
by the proposer to the responder; “Period” is the period number
(an integer between 1 and 5); and “Female” equals 1 for females
and 0 otherwise. Period and Female are added as control vari-
ables and can detect if a significant time trend or gender effect
exists. We denote the lagged variables (i.e., these variables in the
previous period) by adding “t-1.”
To analyze how rejection affects beliefs, we estimate Regression
(1), presented in Table 3. Hypothesis 4a suggests that following a
rejected offer, the proposer’s belief about the minimal acceptable
Table 3 | Regression results.
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression (5)
Dependent Proposer Proposer belief Offer Offer change Change in responder’s
variable belief change from t-1 to t from t-1 to t expectation from t-1 to t
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Constant 9.24 (0.127) 1.64 (0.132) 17.24 (0.006) −6.87 (0.028) 0.05 (0.948)
Rejected t-1 −2.03 (0.515) −0.18 (0.933) 5.99 (0.103) 14.83 (0.001)
Proposer belief t-1 0.82 (0.000)
Offer t-1 0.53 (0.000)
Offer above expectation in t-1 0.16 (0.018)
Period −0.66 (0.030) −0.62 (0.038) −0.11 (0.858) 0.72 (0.274) 0.16 (0.639)
Female −0.37 (0.755) 0.51 (0.537) −1.37 (0.596) −0.58 (0.734) 0.47 (0.480)
R2 0.71 0.01 0.28 0.18 0.16
N 136 136 136 136 136
Wald χ2 278.90 4.97 112.10 10.63 8.16
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.1741 0.0000 0.0139 0.0429
p-values are reported in parentheses. All regressions are GLS. The models are clustered by session. “Rejected t-1” equals 1 if the offer in the previous period was
rejected and 0 otherwise. “Proposer belief” is the proposer’s belief about the minimal acceptable offer and “Offer” is the amount offered by the proposer to the
responder. Both beliefs and offers are in percentage of the pie, i.e., between 0 and 100. “Period” is the period number and “Female” equals 1 for females and 0
otherwise.
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offer will increase. Regression (1) shows that this is not the case
in the data. The coefficient of “Rejected t-1” that was supposed
to be positive according to H4a is in fact negative and not sta-
tistically significant. As a robustness check, we also look at an
alternative dependent variable, which is the change from period
t-1 to period t in the Proposer’s belief. H4a would predict that
the coefficient of Rejected t-1 should have a positive effect on this
new dependent variable. Regression (2), however, reveals that the
coefficient is negative, very close to zero, and not statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, the two regressions do not supportH4a. Receiving
a rejection does not increase the subject’s belief about the min-
imal offer that will be accepted. This is surprising, especially if
we remember that in most cases offers are above the proposer’s
belief about the minimum that the responder will accept (hence-
forth we sometimes use “Responder WTA” as a shorthand for
the minimal amount responders will be willing to accept, with
WTA standing for “willingness to accept”). It is intriguing why
a rejected offer does not make the proposer revise her beliefs.
It seems that the proposers are so confident in their beliefs that
they do not easily change them. However, given that subjects are
not experienced in this game, it is reasonable to update beliefs
based on the observed behavior of responders. The finding that
proposers do not do so may be another example for overcon-
fidence, similar to our findings about the responders’ inflexible
expectations.
Following the results above it is natural to expect thatH4b will
also not be supported by the data. The hypothesized mechanism
was that a rejection causes the belief about the Responder WTA
to increase, and this also increases the next offer. But we now
see that the first step in this chain is missing, because proposers’
beliefs do not change after a rejection. However, Regression (3),
in which the dependent variable is the actual offer, shows that a
rejection increases the next offer by about 6% of the pie com-
pared to an acceptance. Of the 170 offers, 113 are between 40 and
50%, and among the 140 accepted offers, 109 are between 40 and
50%. So an increase of 6% of the pie is economically meaningful
given that much of the variation in the data is in a 10% range. As
a robustness check, we also consider in Regression (4) an alter-
native dependent variable, the change from period t-1 to period
t in the Proposer’s offer. The results are even more salient than in
Regression (3), with a coefficient of 14.83 and p-value of 0.001.
This suggests that our hypothesis H4b is supported by the data.
Figure 2 presents a more detailed look at the effect of rejection
by comparing in each period the average offer for the rejected
vs. accepted offer. Then, we take the same subjects and analyze
their offers in the next period. We see clearly the effect of rejec-
tion on the next offer. For accepted offers, the average always goes
down (by 2.90–7.52% in different periods). For rejected offers,
the average always goes up (by 4.8–16.4%).
The results are puzzling. We hypothesized that a rejection will
lead the proposer to raise her belief about the Responder WTA,
and then consequently raise her next offer. We see the next offer
being raised but not the belief itself. If the belief is not changed,
why does the offer increase? A possible explanation is that the pro-
posers remain confident about the average level of the Responder
WTA, but raise their expectations about its variance; that is, the
rejection causes them to think that heterogeneity among respon-
ders is higher than they previously thought. Then, even if the
average ResponderWTA is believed to stay the same, a higher offer
is justified because it more often (than when ResponderWTA het-
erogeneity was assumed to be lower) avoids the situation in which
the responder has a Responder WTA above average and will reject
the offer11.
11For example, if one thinks that Responder WTA is distributed uniformly in
the range 16–22, and an offer of 22 gets rejected, a modified belief about a
uniform distribution between 13 and 25 may justify an offer of 25 despite the
fact that the assumed average of Responder WTA remains 19. In the question
about the expected ResponderWTA, the subject therefore may still answer the
same way (19), but increase her offer from 22 to 25.
FIGURE 2 | Rejected versus accepted offers in the next period.
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THE DYNAMICS OF RESPONDERS’ EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN PERIODS
To address hypothesis H5, we compute “expectations difference,”
defined as the amount a responder expects to receive in the cur-
rent periodminus the amount he expected in the previous period.
We also compute the responder’s offer above belief in the previ-
ous period, defined as the amount offered to him in the previous
period minus the amount he expected to receive in the previous
period (all these offers and expectations are measured in percent-
age of the pie). A regression with the expectations difference as the
dependent variable and the offer above responder’s expectation
in the previous period as an independent variable [see Regression
(5) in Table 3] gives a coefficient of 0.16 for the latter (p = 0.018).
This positive coefficient is in line with our hypothesis H5 and it
suggests that the responder’s beliefs about what he is likely to be
offered is not fixed but rather is shaped by previous outcomes in
the game. The coefficient being only 0.16, however, also shows
that the adaptation of responders’ expectations is very partial: the
responder updates his belief by only about one sixth of his mistake
in the previous period. The low adaptation is probably the rea-
son that at the aggregate level we do not observe convergence of
expectations to actual offers (see the discussion of hypothesisH2).
THE PROBABILITY OF REJECTION
To analyze the last two hypotheses we estimate regressions where
the dependent variable—“Rejected”—is equal to 1 if the respon-
der rejected the offer and 0 if he accepted. For the sake of
robustness, we estimate both the GLS linear probability model
(LPM) and a logit model. “Responder Expectation” is the amount
the responder expected to receive, whereas “Belief about Others”
is the minimal amount the responder thought that other respon-
ders will accept. Regressions (6) and (7) in Table 4 show that
hypotheses H6a and H6b are strongly supported by the data; the
relevant coefficients have p-values below 0.01 in both regressions.
As we hypothesized in H6a and H6b, the probability of rejection
is a decreasing function of the offer and an increasing function
of the responder’s expectation about the offer. Regression (6)
suggests that increasing the offer by 1% of the pie decreases the
probability of rejection by about 1.7%. An increase of 1% of the
pie in the responder’s expectation about the offer increases the
probability of rejection by about 0.7%. Thus, the offer amount is
more important than the responder’s expectations in its impact
on the probability of rejection. The impact of the offer is more
obvious and can be observed also in other ultimatum game stud-
ies. However, eliciting expectations is more unique to our study
and the significant impact of expectations is interesting. Our
interpretation of it is that the expectations reveal the responder’s
attitude about what a fair and appropriate offer is. Moreover, a
given offer is more disappointing the more it is below the expec-
tations. Therefore, the psychological reaction to a given offer
also depends on expectations and consequently expectations also
affect the probability of rejection. We also see that women are less
likely to reject offers than men, by about 10%, a result that is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. The results of Regression (7),
which uses the Logit model, are qualitatively similar, except for
the gender effect that goes in the same direction but here it is no
longer statistically significant.
Regressions (8) and (9) address hypothesisH7. We still use the
offer, period and gender as control variables, but now, “Responder
Expectation” is replaced with “Belief about Others.” Both regres-
sions support H7: attributing to others a higher threshold for
acceptance raises the probability of rejection. The LPM model
in Regression (8) suggests that an increase of 1% of the pie in
“Belief about Others” raises the rejection probability by about
0.5%. Our interpretation is that the responder’s belief about the
acceptance threshold of other responders is positively correlated
with his own threshold, and therefore creates a positive coefficient
for “Belief about Others.” The results in the Logit model reported
in Regression (9) are qualitatively similar to those of Regression
(8). Both regressions also replicate the results of regressions (6)
and (7) about a negative coefficient for “Offer” (which is statisti-
cally significant) and a negative coefficient for “Female” [which is
statistically significant at the 1% level in regressions (8–9)].
Table 4 | Analyzing the responder’s decision whether to reject the offer.
Regression (6) GLS—LPM Regression (7) Logit Regression (8) GLS—LPM Regression (9) Logit
Dependent variable Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Constant 0.649 (0.000) −0.806 (0.570) 0.790 (0.000) 1.378 (0.206)
Offer −0.017 (0.000) −0.148 (0.000) −0.017 (0.000) −0.162 (0.000)
Responder expectation 0.007 (0.007) 0.108 (0.002)
Belief about Others 0.005 (0.001) 0.091 (0.005)
Period −0.013 (0.374) 0.015 (0.929) −0.010 (0.498) 0.055 (0.800)
Female −0.102 (0.036) −1.347 (0.110) −0.081 (0.005) −1.401 (0.009)
R2 (Pseudo R2for Logit) 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.48
N 170 170 170 170
Wald χ2 114.52 75.6 157.29 126.36
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
p-values are reported in parentheses. The models are clustered by session. “Rejected” equals 1 if the offer was rejected and 0 otherwise. “Offer” is the amount
offered by the proposer to the responder. “Responder Expectation” is the amount the responder expected to receive, and “Belief about Others” is the minimal
amount the responder thought that other responders will accept. Both beliefs and offers are in percentage of the pie, i.e., between 0 and 100. “Period” is the period
number and “Female” equals 1 for females and 0 otherwise.
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Table 5 presents another look at the rejected offers, showing
the number of rejected offers given the offered amount and the
percentage responders believed they would be offered. We can see
that all rejections come from cases in which the offer was smaller
than the responder’s belief about how much he will be offered.
Most rejections occur when the responder expects to receive 50%
of the pie and gets less. Offers above 40% were never rejected in
our sample.
CONCLUSIONS
We take one of the important tools of behavioral economics,
the ultimatum game, and add to the usual decisions about what
offers to make and whether to accept them also an elicitation
of beliefs and expectations. This, together with a multi-period
game that allows to analyze changes due to experience, yield some
interesting findings. We observe a strong preference for round
choices (10, 20%, etc.) in offers and beliefs. Surprisingly, we find
a substantial number of offers (36 of 170) that are below the pro-
poser’s belief about theminimal acceptable offer.We also find that
responders do not predict accurately, even on average, the amount
that will be offered to them, and do not get better in their pre-
dictions as they accumulate experience. At the individual level,
we see some effect of the mistake in expectations in the previ-
ous period on the responder’s expectation about the offer in the
current period, but this effect is relatively small and consequently
at the aggregate level we observe “sticky predictions” that hardly
change.
We find that the proposers’ beliefs about the minimum
amount that responders will accept is significantly higher than the
minimum amount responders believe will be accepted by other
responders. This intriguing finding calls for additional research
to understand its reasons. When we analyze how a rejection in
one period affects the proposer’s behavior in the next period, we
observe an interesting and unexpected pattern. The proposer’s
Table 5 | Frequency of rejection by offer and belief.
Percentage responders believe
they will be offered
20 40 46 50 54 60 Total
Offer (%)
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
10 0 2 0 2 0 0 4
20 0 2 0 3 0 1 6
26 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
30 0 1 1 4 0 0 6
34 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
36 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
38 0 1 0 2 0 0 3
40 0 0 0 3 1 0 4
Total 1 9 1 17 1 1 30
The table shows the number of rejected offers given the offered amount and the
percentage responders believed they would be offered. Only values for which
some rejected offers exist are presented.
belief about the minimal acceptable offer does not change, con-
trary to our predictions. Nevertheless, the proposer’s offer in the
next period does increase following a rejection. While we expect
this result, the hypothesized reason for it was an increased belief
about the minimal acceptable offer, so it is intriguing why we see
the increase in offers without a change in beliefs.
When analyzing what affects the probability of rejection, we
confirm our hypotheses. A higher offer decreases the probabil-
ity of rejection whereas higher expectations of the responder
about the amount that will be offered to him or higher beliefs
about the minimal amount that other responders will accept
increase the probability of rejection. The impact of the offer is
the largest among these three variables. Females seem to reject
offers less frequently, but this result is not always statistically
significant.
The study illustrates how eliciting beliefs can add to our under-
standing of behavior in games and provides some interesting
findings. In several cases we find some inconsistency between
beliefs and actions. We also observe beliefs that are sticky and do
not change much even in light of new evidence. We hope that
this study will encourage others to continue this line of research
and study how belief elicitation can contribute to our understand-
ing of economic behavior in additional settings. In particular, we
believe that some further studies of belief elicitation in ultimatum
games may provide some interesting insights and also examine
the robustness of the results reported here. One direction can be
to conduct an experiment with more than five periods to exam-
ine time trends in decisions and beliefs over a longer horizon.
Another direction can be to ask the responders to provide their
decisions in the strategy method, i.e., to report what is the min-
imal amount that they are willing to accept. This can also enable
to incentivize the belief elicitation procedure. Having different
rules of matching (for example keeping the matching between the
proposer and the responder fixed) or having role switching (pro-
posers who later play as responders and vice versa) and analyzing
how these variations affect behavior and beliefs may also provide
some interesting insights. In addition, the proposer’s behavior
may also be influenced by risk attitudes (see García-Gallego et al.
(2012) for the connection between risk attitudes and gender in
the ultimatum game). Lower offers result in higher earnings for
the proposer if accepted, but also increase the probability of a
zero payoff due to rejection, and therefore more risk aversion can
result in higher offers. Exploring the connection between beliefs,
offers, and risk attitude of proposers in the ultimatum game may
be an interesting direction for future research. Similarly, explor-
ing the role of beliefs, their development over time, and their
connection to decisions and risk attitudes can be interesting also
in other strategic games where a player’s payoff depends on his
own decision as well as on other players’ decisions, such as in the
investment game (e.g., Buchan et al., 2008).
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